1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
4	Plaintiff, )
5	) VS. ) NO. 1:19-cr-10040-JTF-1
6	) )
7	JEFFREY W. YOUNG, JR, )
8	Defendant. )
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10	TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
11	BEFORE THE
12	HONORABLE JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR.
13	March 31, 2023
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17	MORNING SESSION
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23	LASHAWN MARSHALL, RPR
<ul><li>24</li><li>25</li></ul>	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 167 N. MAIN STREET - SUITE 242 MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103

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2	
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1	FRIDAY
2	MARCH 31, 2023
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6	THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, everyone.
7	MR. PENNEBAKER: Good morning. Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: I think everyone's got a copy of the
9	latest version of the closing instructions. Hope y'all
10	have made all the changes that we discussed yesterday,
11	and my understanding is there are a few more edits that
12	we have to do.
13	So Mr. Pennebaker, I'm assuming you'll let me
14	know.
15	MR. PENNEBAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Starting on
16	Page 16.
17	THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
18	MR. PENNEBAKER. In one and two and this is a
19	minor point. It's the text says a practitioner acting
20	within the normal course. We suggest changing it to
21	usual only because the term is later defined as the usual
22	course.
23	THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
24	MR. PENNEBAKER: In addition, Judge, the second
25	element, the defendant that the defendant, knowing

that such prescriptions would not be, as opposed to were 2 not. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Got that one. 4 MR. PENNEBAKER: And moving on. The -- on 5 Page 18, Your Honor, there's an instruction that 6 hydrocodone, oxycodone, and fentanyl are controlled 7 substances. 8 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 9 MR. PENNEBAKER: The indictment charges 10 specifically those drugs, but the antecedent qualifier is 11 including Adderall, which we've heard a lot in this trial 12 as a Schedule II controlled substance as well, and so we 13 would ask that it be included in the definition of 14 controlled substances. 15 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Ferguson? 16 MR. FERGUSON: Is that in the indictment? 17 MR. PENNEBAKER: The word is not specifically 18 used, but it's conspiracy to distribute Schedule II 19 controlled substances, including -- it lists the opioids, 20 but it doesn't list Adderall in the manner and means. It 21 talks all about, you know, distributing other controlled 22 drugs like Adderall and carisoprodol and alprazolam, 23 et cetera. 24 MR. FERGUSON: If I may just have a moment to

look at the indictment real quick and see, find the

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1 language. 2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. PENNEBAKER: Yeah. And Adderall is also 4 dextroamphetamine. 5 MR. FERGUSON: Count 1 says mixtures and 6 substances contained as a detectable amount of Schedule 7 II controlled substance, including hydrocodone, 8 oxycodone, and fentanyl. 9 I'm going to object, but I understand their 10 point on it's -- it's the clause that follows Schedule 11 II, but I'd ask the Court to only instruct on the 12 specifics that are included in the indictment. 13 THE COURT: Is that included in the manner and 14 means, or is that the actual count? 15 MR. FERGUSON: I'm reading the actual count. 16 says Count 1. It's Paragraph 19: From in and about July 17 2014, intentionally combined -- conspired to knowingly, 18 intentionally, unlawfully distribute, dispense Schedule II controlled substances, including. 19 20 So it's Schedule II controlled substances comma 21 including, and they list the three, but it's actually -that is language in Count 1. 22 23 THE COURT: Would you be asking that Adderall be 24 added at all the other locations in the instructions? 25 MR. PENNEBAKER: It would just be the first

count, Your Honor, because of the conspiracy.

THE COURT: I'm not going to include it. We're going to go with the specifics that are in there. It's going to be hydrocodone, oxycodone, and fentanyl.

MR. PENNEBAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PENNEBAKER: So moving on to Page 20, the good faith instruction.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Good faith instruction on Page 20.

MR. PENNEBAKER: After doing some further research on this issue, the government would ask that recklessness be removed for a couple of reasons: One is that the deliberate ignorance instruction includes a sentence at the end that is carelessness, negligence, or foolishness on the defendant's part is not the same as knowledge and would not be enough to convict, which covers the terrain that this addition covers.

In addition, the recklessness is often defined as a conscious disregard of a high probability of the actus reus occurring. And so that's exactly what deliberate ignorance is. And deliberate ignorance is specifically identified as a -- as an appropriate means upon which to convict. So we would be fine with

including that sentence about carelessness, negligence, and reckless -- carelessness, negligence, and foolishness are not sufficient to convict twice: once in the good faith instruction and once in the deliberate ignorance instruction, just so --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ferguson?

MR. FERGUSON: Well, I'm thinking in terms of the specific mens rea that we have in our criminal code, and so we're looking at what it takes under the Ruan decision. It's got to be intentional or knowing, which takes out the other two elements that are typical in a criminal case, which is recklessness and negligence.

I think that the sentence that you have in there is correct, and I think it should remain in there. I think that there's a difference between recklessness and deliberate indifference. There's -- the deliberate indifference is turning a blind eye. It's not necessarily the same as the mens rea of intentional, knowing, reckless, and negligence, so I'd ask that it remain in there, especially in light of the fact that the second sentence that the government talks about, carelessness, negligence, and foolishness, there's -- it doesn't seem to be the argument that it's incorrect, just that they seem to suggest it's already been said once. Why say it twice?

I think it's appropriate where it is, and when it's spoken to the jury, to fully evaluate -- put them on notice as to what their burden of proof is.

THE COURT: But their argument is with regard to recklessness at -- in essence, is a reckless disregard, and so recklessness could -- say that again,

Mr. Pennebaker.

MR. PENNEBAKER: Yes, Your Honor. The recklessness is often defined as a conscious disregard of a high probability that an act is going to result in the criminal form of the behavior. And actually, post Ruan, we — the Department of Justice has taken the position, for a number of reasons, that deliberate ignorance does survive the Ruan decision. There's nothing in Ruan that addresses, on point, that deliberate ignorance can't satisfy the mens rea requirement post Ruan.

Ruan really is a, you know, subjective intent versus "objective act, reasonable person" distinction.

And so a -- recklessness involves that subjective disregard; Ruan does not touch that.

And as far as I'm aware, there's no case

anywhere that -- and defense hasn't cited one that says

that recklessness is no longer sufficient, I mean, at

least in the -- in the iteration of recklessness that is

deliberate ignorance. But that's -- that doesn't survive

Ruan. I haven't seen that in a case, Judge, and I don't know that defense has cited one.

THE COURT: Yes, sir?

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It's an interesting argument, and MR. FERGUSON: it highlights the fact that if the government is going to say that recklessness -- that the sentence negligence and recklessness are not sufficient to convict, then I need to object, then, to the deliberate indifference instruction, because if they're -- if they're saying that they believe recklessness is what Ruan said -- and the Supreme Court spoke very clearly, that it's intentional or knowing, meaning they excluded all other mens rea. And if they're saying recklessness is the same thing as deliberate indifference, I'm -- right now I'm objecting to the jury instruction, deliberate indifference, which if they're arguing that's recklessness, then that's not the right jury instruction for this case. Supreme Court said recklessness and negligence are not sufficient, and if they're not sufficient, they should not be instructed to this jury. So --

THE COURT: You said the Supreme Court basically ruled that recklessness was insufficient?

MR. FERGUSON: If they say the -- that the mens rea for this case, when it comes to licensed professionals, is knowing or intentional -- by that

statement, that that's the element, that's the mens rea element -- then they've excluded all other mens rea elements, which negligence and recklessness are out. If the government's position is recklessness and deliberate indifference are the same thing, then I'm only left with the -- only thing I can do is object to the jury instruction of deliberate indifference.

THE COURT: I understand.

How do you respond to that, Mr. Pennebaker, that basically it is a knowing and intentional crime; doesn't go further to deal with recklessness? And understand what you're saying about recklessness is defined many times as.

MR. PENNEBAKER: Right. So just a basic fact of criminal law, that deliberate ignorance is -- does meet the knowing and intentional mens rea requirement of just about every crime. I mean, I think that's what -- that wasn't even -- whether or not deliberate ignorance -- because deliberate ignorance is a conscious disregard. It -- literally, it goes inside of the mind of the defendant.

THE COURT: I don't have any problem with deliberate ignorance and why it's in there, and I think it's appropriate to leave it in there, but would it extend to reckless behavior?

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MR. PENNEBAKER: Well -- and Your Honor, I think there's a strong argument for just keeping the words as they are, without this addition, because there's not really any confusion about whether or not -- I mean, the jury doesn't know the legal term "recklessness." They do know "foolishness"; they do know "carelessness"; they do know "negligence." THE COURT: But that's not the issue, either, because I could give them a definition for recklessness. MR. PENNEBAKER: Your Honor, I just -- I think that this -- this is -- this is more confusing than helpful, and I don't think that adding an additional --**THE COURT:** Confusing to the jurors or to me? MR. PENNEBAKER: I mean, confusing to everyone, because the -- there's a -- so that the -- the way that the instructions are laid out now, deliberate ignorance specifically excludes negligence, carelessness, foolishness as a -- as a satisfactory basis, when -- when the jury considers whether deliberate ignorance is -- can be a substitute on the facts of this case. Everywhere else in the jury charge it says, in order to convict the defendant, you must find that the defendant knowingly and intentionally. Right? that's -- it's not unclear as to what the mens rea is.

It's just that there's a carve-out for deliberate

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ignorance, just like there is a carve-out for good faith. And those -- I mean, those -- both of those instructions thoroughly define and thoroughly go into -- they're just not -- it doesn't -- the negligence and recklessness language that the defendant proposes is not additive to what's already a very clear jury instruction. THE COURT: One last time, Mr. Ferguson, and I'll go ahead and rule on it. I think I know what I'm going to do with this. MR. FERGUSON: I've --THE COURT: No. MR. FERGUSON: Sorry. THE COURT: What I need to hear from you about is allegedly what they're saying. The way the drugs were distributed, it is almost in a reckless manner. Do you understand what I'm saying? MR. FERGUSON: Yes, sir. THE COURT: So why should recklessness be included in good faith, in the good faith instruction? MR. FERGUSON: Because reckless is a mens rea that the Supreme Court specifically found is not adequate. The Supreme Court was very -- I mean, it's absolutely crystal clear. They weren't clear about a lot of things, but they're crystal clear about what the

intent element is: knowing or intentional, which

excludes any other mens rea.

If we don't -- if we don't have a jury instruction that puts the jury on notice that those other men reas have been exclude, then they're not getting a full and fair jury instruction as to what the law is now after Ruan.

MR. PENNEBAKER: Your Honor, very, very briefly. I would like to see where the Ruan decision says the word "reckless" anywhere. I don't think it's in there. It just is not in there, and it's -- because -- and if it were in there, that would undercut all of the deliberate ignorance instructions across the United States of America because deliberate ignorance is a -- in the Venn diagram, deliberate ignorance falls wholly inside of reckless. So that -- I mean, there's just not a blunt instrument like that that says reckless is not sufficient for this crime.

It's -- there's a -- when there is a conscious disregard -- when the defendant understands the risk that he might be prescribing to an addict and does it anyway, right, that is -- and that is -- he doesn't want the result. He doesn't want that to be an addict. He doesn't -- you know, he's not wanting to harm the patient specifically, like a "knowing and intentional" type of harm would be, but he is aware of the high likelihood

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that this is an addict and this is an outside-the-scope prescription. He says, I don't care; I'm doing it anyway. That's absolutely a crime. That's reckless. MR. FERGUSON: And that's not knowing and intentional. And that's what this is; it's a knowing and intentional crime. THE COURT: But I think it is knowing and intentional. When you disregard everything that you know as far as a medical practice is concerned and you go ahead and prescribe these dangerous drugs, I think that is knowing and intentional. MR. FERGUSON: But you're going in the wrong direction. We know that knowing and intentional also includes reckless. Reckless doesn't include knowing and So the fact that it's not knowing and intentional. intentional, that contains all the other lower mens reas, but it doesn't work the opposite direction. Government's getting an opposite-direction instruction, which is inappropriate. THE COURT: I'm going to take a few minutes. And Mr. Ferguson, I'm going to give you an opportunity to find --MR. FERGUSON: Oh, I didn't bring --

I'm sorry?

THE COURT:

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MR. FERGUSON: I didn't bring my computer; I'm so sorry. I can try it on my phone, but Ruan is so new, that there's --THE COURT: I know that. MR. FERGUSON: -- there's really -- there's no real help for Your Honor. You'd have to look at the law and apply -- what, basically, the Supreme Court has placed before this court is -- at this point, it's knowing and intentional. THE COURT: Knowing and intentional is fully developed throughout the other instructions that I'm going to give. You've indicated before that basically Ruan eliminates this recklessness; that's what I'm concerned with. If there is language that can be construed in -- from Ruan to eliminate recklessness as a consideration, that's what I was going to give you an opportunity to do.

MR. FERGUSON: It's so new that we're cutting new ground here. And I think that's why we have to -- have to really look at the Supreme Court and take into consideration what it specifically said, and what it specifically said excludes recklessness and negligence by the very fact that they were very specific about what the mens rea was and it excluded.

And I know the government's saying, well, they

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didn't say that. Well, they did say that. When you say it's intentional, you are saying it's not reckless and negligence. It's -- because they -- they -- the whole case is raising the standard of the mens rea, not lowering the mens rea.

MR. PENNEBAKER: Your Honor, if I may -- if I may just respond to that very briefly. Looking at the good faith instruction that the defendant proposed that is -- the government has said, hey, that's fine if we want to do that. There's -- this isn't a pattern instruction or anything, but this -- I just want to read from this instruction where this is already covered, which is good faith is not merely a practitioner's sincere intention towards the people who come to see him, but, rather, it involves his sincerity in attempting to conduct himself in accordance with the standard of medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the state of Tennessee, an honest effort to prescribe substances for a patient's condition in accordance with the standard medical practice.

So that is -- that addresses the subjective intent of the defendant. It's saying -- and that really is -- it's a -- it's not -- it doesn't go all the way to just knowing and intentionally: I know and intend to issue outside the scope.

It's that there's a sincere effort being made.

In other words, the defendant is not being reckless in prescribing these drugs. And, again, the government's not asking for an instruction that recklessness is sufficient, because that's what deliberate ignorance — deliberate ignorance carves out. If you're not going to find knowing and intentional, there is one means in which you can find this substitute mens rea, and that is this conscious disregard of a high likelihood that the result of your conduct will be the thing that we don't want.

But to, then, just throw this blanket

"recklessness" term in there when -- if we instruct that

recklessness is not sufficient and then the very next

instruction is a form of recklessness, I mean, you're

basically say you can't conclude based on recklessness,

but then the next instruction says, but you don't have to

find knowing and intentional if you find he was reckless

in this way.

I mean, it's just -- it's incredibly confusing, and it's -- I mean, it really -- when the defendant is asking for a whole cloth instruction that is antithetical to anything on the books right now that any of us can point to and there's only this argument about Ruan going down this knowing and intentional path that doesn't address deliberate ignorance, it just -- why not stick

with what we know works instead of confusing the issue
for the jury and for, frankly, all of us? I mean, I
don't -- I don't understand how those two, the good faith
and the deliberate ignorance instruction, would cohere if
we blanketed recklessness like that.

THE COURT: I understand.

Yes, sir?

MR. FERGUSON: Sticking to what we've always
done is what got us in front of the Supreme Court with
Ruan in the first place. The Supreme Court heard the
case that used to be subjective good -- subjective

come out.

MR. PENNEBAKER: To resolve the circuit split on

to be in there, and the deliberate indifference needs to

intent. Now it's objective, and it's intentional and

I mean, it's as simple as that. And it needs

THE COURT: I'm going to grant the government's request with regard to recklessness. I understand the Court of Appeals. Assuming there are convictions, the Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to take a look at this in several months.

We do have negligence included, Mr. Ferguson.

MR. FERGUSON: Okay.

that issue that doesn't exist here.

THE COURT: I don't know if you want

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carelessness and foolishness added there.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Let me . . .
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              THE COURT: Similar to what's in the deliberate
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     ignorance.
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              MR. FERGUSON: If you would, Your Honor, please.
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              THE COURT: All right. I'll go ahead and add
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     those in there.
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              And of course, I believe you are now objecting
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     to the deliberate ignorance instruction; is that correct?
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              MR. FERGUSON: I made the objection, yes, and
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     I'm still -- I'm maintaining that objection, using the
12
     same argument.
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              THE COURT: Okay. I understand.
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              But I will add, and it'll read negligence,
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     carelessness, or foolishness are not sufficient to
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     convict.
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              Okay. Again, this is for you to decide.
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     what we'll end up going with.
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              Okay. What's next, Mr. Pennebaker?
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: On Page 22, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: The second line in
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     Subparagraph 3, a substance without a legitimate medical
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     purpose outside the usual course, just for the same
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     reason as earlier.
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And I believe the same word needs to be inserted
in the -- on the last line of the paragraph, starting
with Count 8 through Count 14.
         THE COURT: Where was that last one?
         MR. PENNEBAKER: The last line of the paragraph
in the middle of the page 22, beginning Count 8 through
Count 14.
         THE COURT: Outside of the course of
professional?
         MR. PENNEBAKER: Of the usual course, yes, Your
Honor. "Usual" should be inserted in between -- outside
of the "and the course."
         THE COURT: And so Subparagraph 3, outside the
usual course --
         MR. PENNEBAKER: Of professional practice.
         THE COURT: So it was okay the way it was; is
that what you're saying? Maybe I'm misunderstanding.
         MR. FERGUSON: If I can direct the Court,
it's -- in the middle of the page, it says -- starting
where it says Count 8 through Count 14.
         THE COURT: Right.
         MR. FERGUSON: The last line of that long
four-line sentence, I think he's asking for -- where it
says outside the course of professional practice --
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MR. PENNEBAKER: Outside --

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              MR. FERGUSON: -- he's asking for outside the
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     usual course.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: And then also in Line 3, that
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     the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed the
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     substance without a legitimate medical purpose and
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     outside the usual --
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              THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry; say that again.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Okay. At Line 3, that the
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     defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed the
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     substance without a legitimate medical purpose, outside
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     the usual course of professional practice.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Maybe I -- you don't have an
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                   Mine says "usual."
     updated one.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Oh.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Mine says "usual."
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Mine -- on Page 22?
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              MR. FERGUSON: The very last sentence on
     Page 22.
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19
              THE COURT: The last.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: It's the -- it's the -- oh, I'm
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             There's two Subparagraph 3s; that's what the
     sorry.
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     confusion is. The very first Subparagraph 3 up at the
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     top.
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              THE COURT: Oh, okay. I thought you -- you had
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     said at the bottom.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER:
                               I apologize.
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              THE COURT: No problem.
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                     Top of the page, Subparagraph 3, medical
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     purpose outside the usual course of professional
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     practice.
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              We can do that.
 7
              Okay. Go ahead.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Page 23, the fourth line down
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     from the top of the page has the same omission.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Got it.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: And then --
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              THE COURT: The usual course?
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
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              Subparagraph 2, I think there should be -- it
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     says that the defendant did so for the purpose of
16
     unlawfully dispensing or a controlled substance. I think
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     it should be distributing or dispensing a controlled
18
     substance.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Your Honor, I think it may have
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     just said distributing, because the indictment
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     suggests -- well, you said dispensing.
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              THE COURT: Dispensing is in there.
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              MR. FERGUSON: The Count 15 alleges just --
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     well, if I can read, and I may not be able to; I don't
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     have my glasses on. I think it only alleges
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distributing, but they were all -- either way.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: It does. It does.
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                     So then -- yeah, then it should just be
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     distributing.
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              THE COURT: So we take out dispensing,
 6
     unlawfully distributing.
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              It says "or" there.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Take that out, too.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, I'm going to take that out as
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     well.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Then the next -- the bolded for
14
     the purpose of distributing a controlled substance --
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     just because it's a defined term, I think unlawfully
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     needs to be inserted before distributing.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. PENNEBAKER: There was one other thing on an
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     earlier page that I missed, Judge, and that is the old
20
     accomplice instruction, which is on Page 8.
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              THE COURT: Go ahead.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: For the record -- and I don't
23
     think that this is material here, but just for the
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     Court's information, Gutgsell is spelled G-U-T-G-S-E-L-L.
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     We would not insist that --
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              THE COURT: Not a problem. Spell it again.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: It's G-U-T-S-G-E-L-L.
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              THE COURT: Okay. We'll make the change
 4
     throughout.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: And then the last sentence of
 6
     the first paragraph of that testimony of an accomplice
 7
     that only references Dr. Alperovich, the because of his
 8
     cooperation and testimony, Dr. Alperovich hopes, I think
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     it should be Dr. Alperovich and Ms. Gutgsell because of
10
     their.
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              THE COURT: How long ago did she plead, and does
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     she have a sentencing hearing pending? See, none of that
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                I don't know.
     came out.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: She does have a sentencing
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     hearing pending, and I think she pled within the last
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     two --
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              MS. PAYERLE:
                            To three years.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Two, three years. I think it
     was --
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              THE COURT: Would have brought that out a little
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     more clearly during the trial, but what's done is done.
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              So basically on the spelling, I put in an
23
     extra T.?
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              MR. FERGUSON: Yes, sir.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: And the S and the G are
 2
     flipped.
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              THE COURT: I thought she spelled it when she
 4
     got up there.
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                    Well, I'll adjust that language
 6
     accordingly.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Oh, actually, Judge, I'm sorry.
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     It's actually spelled both ways in here. There's -- I'll
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           It's -- it never ceases to confound any of us.
              THE COURT: And I'll add Ms. Gutgsell in that
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11
     last sentence.
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              Because of their corporation?
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: They hope to receive.
15
              Okay.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: And that's it from the
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     government, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
19
              Mr. Ferguson?
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              MR. FERGUSON:
                             I'm good.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. FERGUSON: Yes, sir.
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              THE COURT: All right. My clerk was listening
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          She'll make all those changes for the final copy
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     that will go to the jury. I don't know if y'all want
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additional hard copy or just have them sent to you
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     electronically.
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              MR. FERGUSON: I would take a hard copy, if I
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     could.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. PENNEBAKER: We'll take --
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 7
              THE COURT: Before or after closing?
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              MR. FERGUSON: Before I arque.
 9
              THE COURT: Okay. Then we'll take a brief
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              We'll go ahead and get those copies out to
     recess.
11
     everyone.
12
              All right. Okay. Recess.
13
              (Recess at 10:05 a.m. until 10:27 a.m.)
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              THE COURT: Okay. I'm assuming we're ready for
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     the jury?
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              MR. FERGUSON: Yes.
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              MR. PENNEBAKER: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Bring them in, please.
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              (Jury in at 10:28 a.m.)
20
              THE COURT: Okay. Folks, last push at this
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           We've worked through everything now, and so we're
     time.
     ready to go ahead and proceed with the closing arguments.
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              Remember early in the case, I told you that the
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     government would argue first. Defense will have a full
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     opportunity to argue. And assuming they do, the
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government will have the last -- what we call the rebuttal argument, that being because they had that burden of proof.

I've got the jury instructions, so I'm ready to go, once we conclude the arguments in the case. And then it will be up to you, however long deliberations are going to take. Okay. Let's go ahead and get to it.

So I'm going to turn to the government. You may proceed.

MS. PAYERLE: Thank you, Your Honor.

All right. Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's been an action-packed week, and now it is time to tie it all together and to show you what the government believes this evidence amounts to, to give you a framework for sorting through it, and then to get you to the important work of deciding this case.

We started -- Mr. Pennebaker here started with sex, fame, money, and that's where we've ended up.

You've seen, in the videos, in the "Sail Away with the Rock Doc" advertisement, in the texts and the testimony, that the defendant Jeffrey Young -- he was obsessed with these things, desperate for people to pay attention to him.

He might have done anything to be the womanizer, the rock star, the big fish in the small pond, but it

turns out he only had to do one thing: prescribe. He had to pick up his pen and his prescription pad and prescribe drugs, and not just any drugs, the most dangerous and addictive drugs that are legal to prescribe.

He wanted everyone's attention: beautiful women, rock stars, club owners, tattoo artists, everyone who was anyone. But he quickly learned it was not his winning personality or his tattoos that got their attention, it was the pills.

Jeffrey Young special was that he had the powerful to get them drugs. He had the powerful to get them high. And if you want more detail on this, I do encourage you to page through those text message summaries that Special Agent Scales went over. There's a lot of them in evidence, about 20, more than just the highlights that he covered on the stand. And you'll see over and over again how Jeff Young used that power of the prescription to get what he wanted.

You'll see this kind of barter system that I'm talking about. And I want to just walk through one example of how this played out so that you can see it and the rest of them for yourself. So we're going to take a closer look at Exhibit 76 and the story, if you will, of

Cyndal Story.

In the first few pages -- I won't go through them here, but you can read about how a man named Jonathan Morris is playing matchmaker. He tells Young that she's cool, that she hasn't gotten laid in a while, and he'd let it slip that her ex was abusive. They plan a double date to set them up: dinner, followed by a night in Jeff Young's hot tub. Cyndal flakes. Jeff Young and Jonathan Morris agree, bullet dodged. Jeff Young even says, quote, well, her loss. I can tell by her response that she wasn't that in to me.

But on Page 4 of that exhibit, we finally see here Jeff Young and Cyndal Story connect. He asks for a date. She agrees, but first, she's going to meet him at his clinic. Jonathan goes with her, and they're both texting Jeff Young from the waiting room. You'll see the end of text messages, the chatter about the front desk.

So on this -- on this slide that you're looking at, Jeff Young sends this text to Cyndal Story: This could get interesting, with a little devil emoji.

And then you'll see the grayed-out spot there where he prescribes her drugs, a pretty modest dose of hydrocodone, about 5 milligrams, and a little bit of Xanax. And this, folks, is how the negotiation begins.

You'll read through and see how, over the next

couple of months, they keep each other on the hook: Jeff to see how much attention he can get from Cyndal and Cyndal to see how many powerful drugs she can get from Jeff.

Let's look at a few days later. Cyndal reaches out and asks for a favor. Hydrocodone is just not helping at all. She wants Percocet, 10 milligrams.

You learned in this trial that Percocet is oxycodone, and it's 1.5 times stronger than hydrocodone, and she wants 10 milligrams of it, not the 5 he initially prescribed.

And also look here. She doesn't want to see him. She has to work. She has her kids. Some excuses. She's not interested. She asks if she can send Jonathan over to pick up a prescription. Jeff Young responds by playing hard to get: Sorry. State rights say I can't write anything within 30 days. You have to be seen in the office.

He adds: It's bullshit, but it's the law.

Well, maybe it's the law, but it's certainly not Jeff Young's practice.

Looking at the other text messages in the exhibits from about 74 to 92, to his buddies Chad Newsom, Ben Elston, and others, he prescribes outside the office all the time. But a women, Cyndal Story, she has to come

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see him.
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              Ms. Story pushes back: Is there nothing you can
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     do without me coming in?
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              Jeff Young holds firm: Unfortunately.
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              If she wants her drugs, she comes into the
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     office, and he's not even shy about why.
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              Same day, same conversation.
 8
              I'll let you-all read it.
 9
              And later: I just need you to open up and
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     actually keep a date for once. That would keep -- be a
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     decent start.
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              The next day, Ms. Story capitulates, goes into
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     the office, and Jeff Young prescribes exactly what she
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     asked for, Percocet, 10 milligrams. Even though he
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     claimed he can't prescribe, quote, anything within 30
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     days, he made an exception for her here, prescribing
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     another 90 opioid pills only seven days after this
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     negotiation began.
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              A few weeks go by. Cyndal Story apologizes:
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     Golly, I wasn't in touch.
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              She has a sob story.
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              Jeff Young asks: Let me know if I can do
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     anything to help.
24
              And surprise, there is.
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              I have an appointment with you next Monday, but
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could you see me sooner? 2 She wants to be seen a week early, and Jeff 3 Young agrees. 4 Now, I won't put them all up here, but you will 5 see in the subsequent text messages that he prescribes 6 her something, but she can't get it filled. She tries 7 another pharmacy. It still doesn't work. 8 Jeff Young says: We've exceeded the state limit 9 for any controlled. 10 But yet, sometime the next day, he prescribes 11 her 91-milligram Xanax. And then, again, radio silence, 12 until she writes back. She's got a whole plan about how 13 he can get her more drugs. She's getting pushier and 14 pushier: Just give me another one of the percs per day and then would still be less milligrams. Please do four 15 16 10s a day instead of three. 17 Oh, and then she -- at the bottom there, she 18 remembers. She still has that one-week-from-Monday 19 appointment on the 8th. Can she come in then? 20 Jeff does his part: Sure. Come see me. 21 And on August 8th, she leaves for a prescription 22 for oxy 20s, now double the dose of oxy from the last 23 And they got rid of that pesky acetaminophen. time. 24 We're now on to pure oxy.

You'll see in the text messages that Jeff,

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again, has to intervene at the pharmacy, again, to be sure they fill. But he does intervene, and they do. And quess what? Radio silence until she needs them again. And it goes on like this for a few months. The stakes keep getting raised by either side: Jeff looking for more attention; Ms. Story looking for more drugs. So here, we have Ms. Story: Can I ask a favor? I have an appointment next Monday. I want to come in this week instead. Jeff Young asks for naked pictures. The next month, Ms. Story needs to come in early again, and then also she thinks she has a sore throat. Jeff Young responds with innuendo, and all the while, Jeff Young is getting warnings. Cyndal's ex-boyfriend says: Jeff, you always been cool as a fan, but my girl for eight years is an addictive person. Cyndal Story. You write her any more scripts, you're going to kill her, man. She talked about suicide the other night because she was coming off. You're giving her enough to kill a horse, as many as she is eating, and there's nothing wrong with her. Thanks. And, again, do not contact her on messenger and do not write her any more stupid scripts.

around selling them like some kind of drug dealer and

Later she [sic] says he's -- she's running

then runs out trying to buy them from everyone she can, and it's driving me crazy.

What does Jeff Young do? He prescribes again and again, and not just any drugs but what Dr. Tricia Aultman pointed out are very high doses of oxy, oxycodone, and Xanax, 20-milligram pure oxy pills with a very high street value. One milligram times 90 Xanax is, again, a lot of pills, again, with a high street value.

Until finally the negotiation comes to a head.

Up until now, Cyndal Story has kept Jeff Young at a distance, but no longer. The fact is, knowing that she was an addict and a drug dealer didn't matter to Jeff Young. He was more bothered by the fact that she wasn't putting out, and he decides he wants his payoff.

You can read for yourself there's one more last negotiation. Cyndal needs another favor, another early appointment. Stomach bug.

Now, after the testimony in this case, we can all understand that she's just in withdrawal. Jeff Young has her where he wants her. She's in withdrawal. She's in pain. She needs those drugs, and he tells her what she needs to do to get them.

The negotiation continues for a while. She wants a first date. He, quote, calls bullshit.

Folks, as you read through this in the jury

room, you'll see that she manages to put him off again until after Christmas. She says: I'm busy. I got plans. I need to go till after Christmas.

Jeff is skeptical. He tells her, quote, I'll believe it when I feel it.

But he decides to take the chance. He pushes here to commit to the after-Christmas date. She does, and they say it's a deal. She gets her oxycodone, plus a little extra, some tramadol. But then you see there's nothing else. It looks like Cyndal Story didn't keep her date after all, and Jeff Young stopped prescribing.

I'm highlighting this exchange between Jeff
Young and Cyndal Story, or people connected to her, as an
example of a clear sex-for-drugs exchange, but there are
plenty of other negotiations between Jeff Young and his
special friends that unfold in much this way, and those
are in the exhibits.

So in the interest of expediency, we didn't read through them all in trial, but they're there. And if you need or want more details about these relationships, look at Exhibit 74 through 79, and they'll be available to you as evidence.

Now, I'd like to zoom back out for a moment and get back to your job, which is reaching a verdict. I want to talk about how this behavior translates into the

crimes that are charged in the indictment. Of course you've seen plenty of evidence that Jeff Young was playing an elaborate game of make-believe. He pretended he was cool; he pretended he was famous; he even pretended he was a musician. But lots of people delude themselves a least a little bit to follow their dreams. This case isn't about that. The crime here is that he pretended he was practicing medicine, but the drugs that he was prescribing were very, very real.

You see, he rented this building and built this business, Preventagenix, on a business model.

Daniel Rogers: He was a quick witness, but he told you the business model of Preventagenix was bringing people in who wanted narcotics because they would come back every month.

Jeff Young was so far outside the scope of professional practice, that once law enforcement closed his doors, there was no one out there -- almost no one would prescribe to his patients.

Tricia Stansell, his former patient, told you that when Preventagenix's door closed with the law enforcement action, she couldn't find anyone else to give her prescriptions, and so she turned to street drugs.

You'll remember she told you it was that situation that finally made her realize that she was hopelessly

addicted. Why didn't she know it before? Because the man that she believed to be her medical provider never told her, never helped her with it, didn't even tell her that the fentanyl he was prescribing her was an opioid. You might remember her story about shutting herself in her room for five days with nothing but a bible and a television and hoping she didn't die. That is the position that Jeff Young put her in.

But while Preventagenix was still in operation, folks, people came from all over Tennessee to get drugs from him, from Memphis, Nashville, Madison, Lauderdale, Carroll, and Benton, from Fayette, Tipton, Haywood, Chester, and Decatur Counties and beyond.

Kristie Gutgsell, the office manager, and Daniel Rogers told you that the people who wanted controlled substances came back month after month for the one-month follow-ups you saw in Exhibit 8. We're going to see that later. And you saw that these folks had insurance, which Jeff Young billed.

Natalie Seabolt. Nurse Natalie Seabolt: You remember she showed you the charts and the data? She told you that Medicaid is a taxpayer-funded healthcare program. These people weren't getting healthcare; they were getting drugs. No matter. Jeff Young was billing Medicaid for it anyway. He billed Medicaid to the tune

of about \$4 million.

And the business model worked. In the two-year period charged in the indictment, Jeffrey Young at his clinic Preventagenix provide -- excuse me -- prescribed more than 1.3 million controlled substances into his community, increasing his prescriptions and his patient populations month after month, and pulling in more than a half million dollars in Medicaid money alone, plus whatever he collected in cash and other insurance.

But ladies and gentlemen, even if it happens in a pretty building, dealing drugs is still illegal. It's illegal for everyone, even people with a pen and a stethoscope. And that is why we're all here.

You have one job today, and that's to fill out this form, the verdict form. It doesn't actually look -- the formatting is a little different, but it contains -- it looks like this; I've got it here. But it contains all the information, and you might just be able to see that a little bit better on the screen.

This verdict form here that I'm going to show you, it has 15 questions on it -- okay? -- one for each crime that Jeffrey Young is charged with. And you have to decide whether the government has proven these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

So as expeditiously as possible, my job right

now is to take you through this form, to explain to you why the evidence leads, beyond any reasonable doubt, to a checkmark next to guilty on each of these counts.

So let's dive into Count 1, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. All right. Put away your tinfoil hats and talk of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy is a real thing in the law, and it boils down to an agreement. If Jeff Young agreed with one or more people to distribute these controlled substances unlawfully, then he's guilty of Count 1.

Well, when I say "unlawfully," what do I mean?

It's the second bullet on this slide. You'll probably remember that mouthful I had to keep saying over and over again with Dr. Aultman: A prescription for narcotics is an unlawful prescription or prescription for controlled substances is an unlawful prescription if it's issued not for a legitimate purpose by a practitioner acting within the usual course of professional practice in the state of Tennessee.

So put more simply -- and I'll use the shorthand throughout the closing so I don't have to keep saying that over and over again -- when he wrote the prescriptions he was writing, he was supplying drugs to dealers and addicts, not practicing medicine.

So what about the term "agreement" at the first

bullet point there? Well, the thing is -- Jeff Young -he couldn't do this alone. He needed the assistance of
office managers. Kristie Gutgsell told you that she
signed on to help Jeff Young, understanding what he was
doing was wrong. She gave him money to keep his clinic
open. She -- she helped him day to day. Dr. Alperovich
lied to the medical board, and Dr. Rudin, if you remember
him from early in the trial -- he didn't testify, but he
was talked about -- Jeff Young's buddy, he stayed in
Chicago -- he was -- served at -- as the sort of last
supervising physician through most of 2016, cashing his
check while Jeff prescribed.

And the judge will need -- will instruct you.

These people didn't need to sort of sit down and enter into a contract to engage in illegal drug dealing or sit in a back room and, you know, conspire to commit a crime.

They -- criminal organizations rarely sort of formalize these things.

Conspiracies happen through action. People know and understand what is going on in this conspiracy. They understand that there is illegal activity taking place, and they help each other. They join; they agree to join; they work together to an unlawful purpose.

Okay. That's Count 1, conspiracy.

Now we're going to count -- skip all the way to

Count 15, which is at the end of your verdict form, and this is a crime that someone commits when they knowingly open, lease, or maintain a place, like the Preventagenix clinic, for the purpose of distributing a controlled substance.

building doesn't actually make the drug dealing any better; it's actually a separate crime. And it was. He used that building to bring patients in the door, to collect cash from them, to give them the drug test that he ignored but that he used to paper the file. He used the back door of that building to welcome in the likes of Ben Elston, Jay Green, or any one of the dozens of women that he was sleeping with or trying to sleep with.

Kristie Gutgsell told you that 80 percent of the patients, the people that walked in and out of those doors at Preventagenix, were getting controlled substance prescriptions. And even for the so-called regular patients, the ones that weren't beautiful or famous.

Daniel Rogers: You remember him? He told

you -- he told you about Jeff Young's business motto:

Paying patients make the money. Pain patients pay, and
they show up every month.

Two different witnesses told you around 80 percent of Jeff Young's business at Preventagenix was

based on his controlled substance prescriptions. And every time they'd walk in the door, Jeff Young would bill their insurance. And that's Count 15.

So we've talked about Count 1 and Count 15, the first and last counts: conspiracy and maintaining a drug premises. That kind of covers a range of dates, which you'll see in the indictment: 2014 to 2017.

But in addition to these overarching counts, the indictment charges him with 13 specific instances of illegal prescribing for which the evidence proves that he is guilty, and these are Counts 2 through 14. And you'll be asked to reach a verdict on each of these counts as well.

through 7, have an extra element. So the -- in other words -- so for 2 through 14, we're talking about distribution. And what you have to find there -- what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant in these cases knowingly, on those instances, or intentionally distributed oxycodone and hydrocodone, knowing, at the time of the distribution, that it was controlled and knowingly or intentionally distributing it without a legitimate medical purpose outside the course of professional -- the usual course of professional practice. Okay. So for each of those,

that's what the -- that's what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

For Counts 2 through 7, there is an extra element, and that is because those counts charge

Mr. Young with individual distributions to a pregnant woman, Hope Rogers. And so for those counts, you also have to find that the defendant knew that Hope Rogers was pregnant. So because Counts 2 through 7 deal specifically with Hope Rogers, I want to spend a little bit of time on her.

This is Hope Rogers; you may remember her. She was the witness who was in custody. She testified in her red jumpsuit, and she's the one who was pregnant when Jeff Young prescribed her Xanax, alongside oxycodone and hydrocodone, in ever increasing doses, so many, that [REDACTED], her daughter, was born with opioids in her system and spent days in the NICU.

Counts 2 through 7 accuse Jeffrey Young of prescribing -- so what we're going to do now is just turn to those counts, let you see what they are. So the way this is structured is each count is associated with an approximate date of the distribution, plus the drug that was distributed. And for each of those counts, there's a line on your verdict form where you have to indicate quilty or not quilty or in this case -- yep, indicate or

maybe circle; in some way, indicate.

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All right. Let's take a look at Hope Rogers.

All right. Let's start at the beginning. For this,

we'll be looking at -- this is Exhibit 101 and

Exhibit 122. Those are the exhibits you'll have with

you. 101 is the entire patient file, and all the

prescriptions compiled together are at Exhibit 22.

So walking in the door, Tricia Aultman walked through her patient file and showed how painfully obvious it was that she was a drug seeker. Her diagnoses didn't make sense; they contradicted her records. They contradicted each other, but that didn't matter. Jeff Young discontinued her codeine, that DC Tylenol 3, and he put her on hydrocodone and Klonopin. At this point, Hope Rogers is not pregnant yet, but Jeff Young is already over the line.

Dr. Tricia Aultman told you that putting her on a powerful opioid at this point made absolutely no sense from a medical perspective. There was nothing in her file to suggest a legitimate medical purpose for these drugs. And by the way, Hope Rogers, herself, told you that. These conditions haven't changed. Her body hasn't change. She still has some pain in her wrists, but she's been off the drugs for years. She says: I definitely didn't need them.

What was actually wrong with Hope Rogers, according to both Tricia Aultman, who's never met her, and Hope Rogers, herself, was that she was addicted from the -- to the medication, a fact that was painfully obvious from the very beginning. But Jeffrey Young described anyway because these prescriptions gave him access to a new, devoted, young, attractive, new patient.

Count 2 is the prescriptions from March 5th, a couple months later. Now, what information does Jeffrey Young have? Well, at her February visit, she's just told him that she found out she was pregnant, so now he's prescribing this already unlawful Percocet that has no medical purpose to a woman that he knows is pregnant. And that is why he's guilty of Count 2.

At Count 3, on March 25, just 20 days later, he has even more information. She's vomiting uncontrollably. She has blood in her bowel movements, diarrhea. These are all symptoms of withdrawal. So what does he do? He switches her to hydrocodone. After all, it's been less than 30 days since her last visit, so she's going to have a hard time filling a prescription from a Percocet.

Tricia Aultman explained that this early prescription by 10 days effectively upped her dose because she's still got 10 days, in theory, of her

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Percocet prescription left. So if she were taking these pills, as Jeff Young prescribed them, for this 10 days, she's on six pills a day: three of hydrocodone and three of oxycodone. No matter. Jeff Young's now switching her drugs just to avoid her getting flagged at the pharmacies, and he keeps prescribing. A month later, Jeff Young has even more information. You see, Hope Rogers has failed her drug screen. She's taking more drugs than Jeff Young is prescribing. By now, you'll recognize Jeff Young's handwriting on this document. I don't know what it says, but you'll recognize the handwriting. He's seen this document. He doesn't care. On her April 23rd patient note, there's another reminder in the chart that she's pregnant, and that brings us to Count 4. On April 23rd, Jeff Young not only prescribes more inappropriate hydrocodone, but he adds Xanax. That's April 23, 2015. April 23, 2015. On that date, he's also texting with his friend Chad Newsom who says: Brie's little sister killed herself last night. Can pregnant people have Xanax? She's tore up, dude. Jeff Young writes: No. It would harm the baby.

He pushes back.

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It's going to be tough the next few weeks. Let's go ahead and get her on something. Jeff Young writes back: Exactly. That's worse for her than taking something, but Xanax is a definite no. But here's Hope Rogers' patient chart at Preventagenix another -- a month later, a reminder she's pregnant, with Xanax still listed as one of her medications. And Count 5 is the prescription on May 20th. this time, it's clear from her drug screens that she's spiking her urine, scraping a piece of her pill into it. Jeff Young knows he needs to talk to her about it, says so on that chart, but he prescribes more hydrocodone. This time, upping her dose to 120 pills, now four a day, and of course more Xanax. Count 6, a month later. Here, it's Jeff Young who writes on her patient chart that she's pregnant -you see his handwriting there? -- and again ratchets up

the drugs. Now she also has Percocet just before the baby is born. At this point, there is no question this child will be born with opioids in her system; Jeff Young has made sure of that.

And on July 17th -- you heard Hope Rogers testify that she has a tough time getting this last

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prescription out of Britney Petway, who's Jeff Young's employee, but she got Jeff Young on the phone, Britney Petway did, and Hope Rogers walked out with the prescription. Now, Dr. Aultman told you that this prescription, like all the other, was well outside the scope of anything resembling medicine. But, also, Jeff Young has even more information because she's -- because Hope Rogers has been in a hospital for -- maybe that's the preterm labor. And she calls -- and she texts Jeff Young. She says: I have nothing to fall back on. This is just a couple of weeks, and she's already finished her last 30-day supply? But Jeff Young kept prescribing. After Hope Rogers had the baby, the problematic drug screens kept coming in over and over again, but Jeff Young kept prescribing. You heard from -- for yourself -- how Hope Rogers left Jeff Young's clinic during this time because it was too crowded and the wait was too long. She got a

DUI. She couldn't get the drugs elsewhere, and so she had to come back. Guess what? Jeff Young kept prescribing.

Folks, this concludes our story about Hope Rogers and the counts related to her. There can be no

doubt that Jeff Young knew that Hope Rogers was pregnant. He knew that these prescriptions were absolutely outside the usual course of professional practice and not for any legitimate medical purpose. He wandered between hydrocodone and oxycodone, twice upped her dose while she was carrying a baby, prescribed Xanax on the very day she texted -- he texted his friend that Xanax would harm a baby, ignored inconsistent drug screens, gave her early refills. And you heard how crossing paths with Jeff Young impacted Hope Rogers' life forever. So on these counts, 2 through 7, we ask that you return a verdict, the only verdict consistent with the evidence, which is a verdict of guilty.

And so let's move on to Counts 8 through 14.

Counts 8 through 14 cover the undercover operations in this case. The videos, which I'm not going to replay here, you'll remember them. But they're at exhibits, for your notes -- those who are taking them -- are Exhibits 28 through 33, plus 73, if you want to watch those videos again.

Counts 8 through 12 are the distributions to

Katie Tripp. You heard her testify today [sic]. The

K.S. refers to a previous married name, but we're talking

about Katie Tripp who was the first undercover officer

you heard from. And you remember she went in undercover

as Katie Crowder.

On her first official visit to the clinic in

May, she saw someone other than Jeff Young who prescribed

her tramadol, which was a level of opioids. That's not

on this chart. And in Exhibit 28, you saw the first

visit on June 7, 2016, in which she actually saw Jeff

Young. You saw, in Exhibit 28, a video of her paying

cash. And in Exhibit 29, you saw the entire interaction

between Katie Tripp and Jeff Young on that visit.

Beyond her claims that she was a waitress and with back pain, Jeff Young knew nothing about her pain. He made no attempts whatsoever to diagnose it. He didn't warn her of any risks. She told him she hadn't bothered to fill the tramadol. She'd once gotten some hydrocodone from a friend, and it seemed to work. She had once gotten an MRI, but it didn't really show anything, and she didn't know where it was, and Jeff Young told her to bring it in so he could paper the file. He was very explicit: Just give it to me; I need something in the file.

This all took about two minutes.

And then for the next six minutes of this visit, he tried to impress her with his reality TV show. And then he wrote a prescription for hydrocodone, which Tricia Aultman -- Dr. Aultman -- told you had absolutely

no basis in real medicine.

On the second visit, patient, quote, Katie

Crowder, goes back and asks for fentanyl because it,

quote, worked for a friend. She still doesn't have that

MRI. Jeff Young says, sure, and jumps her immediately to

a 50-microgram patch of fentanyl, which Tricia Aultman -
Dr. Aultman -- says that's what she uses to treat cancer

patients to keep them comfortable at the end of their

lives.

The undercover officer asks Jeff Young if she could take the hydrocodone and the fentanyl that he prescribed together. Jeff Young said it was no problem. That was way off base. According to Dr. Aultman, if she had taken those drugs together, as prescribed by Jeffrey Young -- including the fentanyl patches -- she could have died.

Count 10. Katie Crowder and Mr. Young have another visit on or about 8/16. Much shorter. She says she likes the fentanyl, but she still feels pain. And so without any further questions or counseling, Mr. Young, again, ups the fentanyl to 75 micrograms. This is unthinkable, said Dr. Aultman.

On Count 11, on or about 9/13/2016, she comes back. It's a quick visit.

Let's see here. Which one are we at?

Count 11. She comes back, and it's a quick visit. It's at Exhibit 32. And she's still kind of in pain, and so Jeff Young ratchets up he Lortab, so she's now on a deadly dose of fentanyl and more hydrocodone.

And you heard her in the video, folks. She's not altered; she's not slurring; she's not moving around like she's in pain. She's perky; she's happy; she's comfortable. She's very clearly not taking these very strong drugs that Jeffrey Young is prescribing to her, these very strong, high street-value drugs that Jeffrey Young is prescribing to her, but Jeffrey Young keeps prescribing them.

Now, Counts 12 and 13 are for the same visit, the one in October 2016. You can remember the October visit because he's inviting them to the Halloween party, the big, raging Halloween party where people are swinging from chandeliers. There's two undercovers at this visit, that's why there's two counts: Katie Crowder and Kristina St. Laurent, the KSL that's going to be in the indictment. Kristina St. Laurent: She's undercover as Christina Norton, so you heard from her as well.

Jeff Young flirts a little. He explains how he's trying to make marijuana legal. He brags about insider knowledge. He invites them to his rager of a Halloween party. And by the way, he doesn't suggest that

they not drink alcohol while on all of these drugs.

Quite the opposite. He says, you know, you should come;
you should fit in.

Christina Norton asks for, quote, tabs, which is the street term for Lortabs. Jeff Young does kind of a cursory exam, which Tricia Aultman told you was absolutely nowhere near anything that would be appropriate to diagnose her back pain.

Katie Crowder walks out with more hydrocodone and fentanyl, and Christina Norton, who Jeff Young was seeing for the first time, gets oxycodone, 10 milligrams, three times a day.

And at Count 14, Tricia -- Christina Norton goes back in. Somebody has faxed Jeff Young a completely normal MRI for her, which says -- which he says in the video he's never looked at. In fact, ironically, according to Dr. Aultman, the only thing wrong with her in this MRI is that she's a little bit constipated. You also learned that opioids make you constipated. Anyway, he says in the video he's never looked at it, but he prescribes her more drugs. Dr. Aultman told you none of these prescriptions make any medical sense; they're not even close.

And if you watch the videos, you'll see that the interactions are not medicine. They're much more in line

with Jeffrey Young's pattern of bringing young,
attractive women back to his clinic over and over again,
giving them more and more drugs, grooming them, if you
will.

A quick word about the dates: I know you've all been paying very close attention to these dates and details, which we really appreciate. You'll see in the indictment two of the dates on these counts don't quite match up. It's a -- they say, maybe, six, and it's 16 or something like that. There is a jury instruction for that.

You'll note, then, the indictment charges offenses were committed on or about certain dates. The government doesn't have to prove the crimes happened on an exact date. We have to prove the crimes happened reasonably close to those dates. You'll see there's no issue with that. And we've made it through all the counts.

So the last thing that you need to know is that for each of these counts, it will be important that you find Jeff Young committed these crimes knowingly or intentionally, that if he didn't realize he was committing any kind of crime, had a completely innocent intent, was negligent or careless, that he can't be found quilty.

So we have to do a little bit of diving into his mind. We have to figure out if he understood that he was acting illegally. And you'll get a lot of instructions on what that means: knowing and intentionally. But there is evidence of that, too, in spate, that he knew what he was doing was wrong, and he continued to do it anyway.

So you have this instruction. We, in the law, did -- they don't teach us mind reading in law school.

We don't have crystal balls where we can figure out what's in people's minds. And there's just really -- it's really hard to prove a defendant's -- you can't do it because nobody can read another person's mind. We still haven't figured out how to do that. But their state of mind can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances, things like what the defendant said, what the defendant did, how the defendant acted, and other facts and circumstances in evidence that show you what was in the defendant's mind. So just think about the evidence through that lens in this case.

Jeff Young is prescribing drugs to help a player out, to lure women for sex, to impress a VIP, to trade for marijuana and tattoos, to keep a bodyguard around, for access to party with rock stars, to get VIP access to clubs, to get police information about his enemies and

about himself.

You saw how Jeffrey Young groomed women to draw them into his practice. And although he didn't make sexual advances on the undercovers, you can watch the videos. He was flirty, friendly; invited them to a raging party at his house. You can see he let them come together, a couple of girls together, each driving from wildly different parts of the state, all to get controlled substances.

You saw his M.O. in his text messages, keep them coming back. Once they're hooked, ask for what he wants. You saw that in the video.

And folks, he's a medical professional. He is a smart and previously well-respected nurse practitioner.

And Dr. Aultman told you these prescriptions weren't even close.

Folks, this was blatant drug dealing, and Jeff
Young knew it, and we know he knew it because he lied to
cover it up. People don't lie to cover up perfectly
acceptable behavior, but Jeff Young lied. He lied to
three different investigators at the medical board when
they interviewed him. He papered files. He got a stamp
so he could forge a signature from his supervising
physician. He lied about having sex with Courtney
Howell. He told them he never put people on more than

one opioid. He said he hated prescribing Xanax, and he never had a break in his supervision. He told them he consistently did exams; he fired patients if they came back with multiple inconsistent drug screens regularly; he did this and so on. And you saw in the evidence how it contradicts statement after statement after statement.

And speaking of supervisors, he lied to

Dr. Alperovich saying he was operating a cardiovascular

prevention and family medicine clinic. He wasn't. He

lied about getting electronic medical records and about

discharging patients who had tested positive for drugs.

He even lied in little ways to his friends and supporters

or if -- telling them the filming company came to him,

for example, when, in fact, he paid them -- right? -- to

produce his reality show. But worst of all, he lied to

his patients.

There's a -- there's a -- I'm going to -there's an old proverb here, and it's that you can't -you can't hide fire by wrapping it in paper. Maybe that
paper, you know, covers up the fire for a second, but
then the fire burns right through. Paper spreads the
fire. The paper makes the fire worse.

Jeff Young tried to hide his unlawful prescribing literally by wrapping it in paper, by creating false medical records that made it look like he

was practicing medicine when he clearly was not, and that paper just spread the fire. Because of that paper, all the trappings of the medical clinic, you know, people trusted him because he said he was -- he said he was their medical care provider. And that just made the problem worse.

These patients believed they were getting medical care, when, in reality, they were getting used for their insurance, for their money, for their access, and for their bodies.

And that brings us to the true tragedy of this case, which is the regret of what could have been. You see, Jeff Young might have been a good practitioner, and there were plenty of sick people in Jackson that wanted and needed real medical care. You heard from two of them: Tricia Stansell and Hope Rogers.

And he even had a good concept, like a guy you could relate to, who listened, who paid attention to the real issues, who treated the whole problem. He understood that's what medical care was. That's what he told people he was doing. That's proof that he knew -- that he knew what medical care was and should be.

Hope Rogers needed care. She testified to you she was an addict. She was a victim of abuse. She'd gotten cut off from pain meds after a DUI. And she had a

good relationship with Jeff Young. Hope Rogers testified that if there was anyone on the planet that could have talked her into rehab, that person was the defendant, Jeffrey Young. But instead, he just gave her more drugs.

She testified she, quote, go in, get your prescription, and leave, she explained. And not just her. Patients were elbow to elbow, she said, in the waiting room.

Jeff Young was not an unconventional provider with a special touch any more than he was a rap star. He wasn't listening to find out what was wrong with his patients. He wasn't treating their conditions. He was letting them down; he was making them worse; he was dealing drugs. And so we ask that you return verdicts consistent with that evidence: guilty on all counts.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And for the defense, Mr. Ferguson, you may proceed.

MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

Broken, playing a character, but he was always a practitioner. Now, you may not think he was a good practitioner, and you might not agree with his decision making, but at all times in this case, Jeff Young was operating under the license given to him by the state of Tennessee to be a nurse practitioner, to make medical

decisions, and to prescribe medications.

Government's right. You heard, at some point in his life, Jeff Young was highly respected. He's smart. He knew what he was doing, and he had the world at his feet as a nurse practitioner, as a good nurse practitioner, as a smart nurse practitioner. But what do you know happened?

So many times we see this. Even their own expert talked about why it's so important for medical providers to take care of themselves and to seek help when they are going through hard times, depression, drugs, or alcohol. He got into a horrible divorce, and it spiraled him out of control. That's what Ms. Goslee told you, the first witness in this case, is that she knew Jeff, and she watched him spiral.

But there's an additional problem with Jeff
Young's spiraling out of control through the divorce.

That's -- the second part of this is taking on the
persona of the Rock Doc. Be popular? To be famous? Or
to hide the pain and the trauma that he's going through,
to hide that under this ridiculous, ridiculous character:
come sail away with me, the Rock Doc, the rapper, with
Puffy K, his buddy, by his side? It's all signs and
symptoms of the problems that were in his head because of
what he was going through and because he was out of

control.

Third part of that: You've heard testimony from Ms. Goslee and Ms. -- Ms. Gutgsell that he was expanding his practice too quickly, in this mantic state of the Rock Doc. People that he communicated with and connect with, he, all of a sudden -- on top of everything that's going on his life that's got him out of control -- that he wants to expand a practice down to downtown Jackson, the downtown office, and another one to what? It was Trezevant or wherever in Tennessee. And he's expanding at a rate that, at one point -- and I think the testimony was he was seeing up to a hundred.

After those two shut down, everybody consolidates back to the mother ship, up to a hundred people a day, in that mantic state he's in of the Rock Doc, that he's going to do it all himself. He's trying to see a hundred patients a day, when Dr. Aultman told you it's 25, 30 max. He's seeing three times the number of patients that it's even possible.

You think he's doing a full exam on a hundred people, or is it just he's going into the room, listening to their complaint, writing a prescription, moving on to the next patient, trying to hit that 50, 60, hundred patients a day?

See, the problem here for the government is Jeff

Young -- they have to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt, and that reasonable doubt is that they have to convince you that he was intentionally going above and beyond his license. And it's very specific language in the jury instructions, that it has to be without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the course of professional practice, that -- I asked Dr. Aultman what are opioids for. Treating pain. What was he doing? He was hearing the complaint of pain and prescribing opioids. That's the medical purpose of the drugs in which we're here for today.

Outside the course of professional practice.

Where was he doing this? He was doing this at his professional practice because he's a nurse practitioner with a clinic, and he's running through those patients:

Oh, you have back pain. Let's try this. I'll see you in a month. You tell me how it works for you. Oh, it didn't work for you? Well, here, let's try this one until we can find what works for you.

What did he tell a nursing board? I'll titrate it. I will only titrate it twice, meaning he starts out with a prescription, changes it, changes it. He even told the nurse -- or the nursing board that that's his practice: We'll start you out on something. Come back in and tell me how it works, and we'll go from there.

That's within his practice. That's not intentionally becoming a drug dealer. That may be, quite frankly, being a bad practitioner, and there's jury instructions that we'll talk about in a few minutes about that. Because the jury instructions this Court's going to give you will tell you that carelessness, negligence is not sufficient to convict on any charges in this case. This is not a malpractice case. This is not a negligence case. This is not he was careless. This is he intended; he's out of control. He's seeing hundreds of patients a day. He's spiraling.

The proof was his divorce attorney Mr. Donahoe was there on a weekly basis. He's one of those back-door patients. But he's there to discuss the divorce. And you heard it was ugly. I think the -- I think the word was the wife was giving it as good as she was getting it. And they were getting it and giving it to each other, and it was all over social media. I think it was -- Topix, I think, was what they were referring to they use in Jackson. Facebook.

So intentional, knowing, it's not here in this case, ladies and gentlemen.

The government put on Ms. Gutgsell. Can't spell her name. She discussed with you Dr. Alperovich and that he actually came in and reviewed the records. Jeff sat

down with him. And you've heard from him also; he testified. And that he had questions about Jeff's prescribing habits and that Jeff explained to him why he did what he did and that, to him, to the physician, the doctor, the M.D., it made sense. He signed off on the jackets. Problem was it just took a long time because he was going through each file individually with Mr. Young.

Now, at some point, he decided that he didn't want to continue to be a preceptor because he was afraid of the prescribing habits. He never stopped them. He never reported Jeff. He never called the police, never called the nursing board. He just said, I'm uncomfortable going forward with this agreement.

The problem with that is he had already told

Jeff -- he had already signed off on those files, again,

because Jeff has to have an M.D. sign off on those files

telling him that everything's okay. And that's what he

got from Dr. Alperovich, until he said, I'm

uncomfortable; I think you're overprescribing.

But -- and then what do we find out from

Ms. Gutgsell? Jeff thinks he was smarter than anyone

else. And why would Jeff think he's smarter than anyone

else? Because at this point he's out of control. Again,

spiraling. He's the smartest person in the room. He

knows everything. He knows what's best for the patients,

his patients, which means he's not intentionally trying to give them illegal drugs. It's his good faith belief that he's helping people. No matter what any other doctor says, Jeff Young thought he was helping people, wanted to help people.

I mean, if you want to be a drug dealer, can you think of an easier way to be a drug dealer than trying to see a hundred patients a day? Just go down to the border, buy the drugs, bring them back, sell them on the street corner. As the government's told, they're really expensive. But instead, you're running a full-service healthcare clinic with multiple employees, hundreds of patients a day, a billing department, a referral department, nurses, X-ray, and everything else in there. You're having to pay payroll; you're having to pay rent; you're having to pay insurance, malpractice, license. It's a really expensive way to become a drug dealer.

I found it interesting that Dr. Alperovich, who, at some point, was the indicted co-conspirator and is now not indicted or is not -- is not -- well, actually he's not the conspirator because what did I ask him? Do you have an agreement with Jeff?

Again, you'll get the jury instructions. Look at them carefully. What is a conspiracy? It's an agreement; that's it. It's not -- it's not the illegal

acts. The illegal acts are separate crimes. Selling drugs to a pregnant woman, that's a separate crime.

Selling the drugs to an undercover officer, that's a separate crime. Conspiracy is a crime. It's not what we call -- we call them substantive acts, the substantive acts are the selling, the drug sales. But the conspiracy -- the conspiracy itself is a crime, and conspiracy is that agreement. When two people agree to break the law, it's that agreement among the two people. That's the crime; that's the conspiracy. The government has to put on proof that Jeff conspired with one or more persons. Well, Dr. Al very clearly said, no. Nope, no agreement.

And Dr. Rudin hasn't testified.

And the government hasn't put on any proof of any agreement among any parties with Jeff. That's the conspiracy charge; that's Count 1, where there is no proof of any agreement. And the government will tell you, and I'll tell you; it can be -- it can be spoken or -- unspoken or spoken. It can be in writing or not in writing, but it's got to be an agreement. There's got to be proof that two or more people agreed, and in this case, it's to distribute drugs to the patients.

Nobody's come in here and testified that they were a co-conspirator. Not a single person have said

that they were a co-conspirator.

Counts 2 through 7 with Hope Rogers -- or now it's Arment because I think she told us was her last name. But Hope Rogers in the indictment, that's the illegal dispensing of narcotics to a pregnant woman. That one was interesting.

I want to talk to you about what we learned while we were in trial with that. I know we did the -Defense didn't put on any proof, and I know I didn't ask a lot of questions. But I hope that when I did ask questions, they were very pointed and that they were illustrative or illustrate the problems with the government's case. I didn't want to beat around the bush. There are certain huge problems within this case.

And Hope Rogers. She came to Jeff already prescribed hydrocodone. She was already on pain medication before she came to Jeff. How many times did we have to ask? Because the government didn't put it on, and they didn't tell you. We had to put it on so that you would know because I would think you would want to know this, when it's your duty to determine my client's guilt or innocence. Wouldn't you have liked to have known that they were already on pain medication before they came to see Mr. Young?

I know we -- there was some talk about

continuity of care, but that's exactly what we're talking about here. If you go and you leave one doctor and you go to the next doctor and you're on medication, you kind of expect that that prescription continues. I agree with Dr. Aultman. You still have to do a -- an independent evaluation, but part of that independent evaluation is looking to see what other doctors have done. What? You expect your doctor -- I'm on heart medication. I go see another doctor, and he goes, oh, you don't need that heart medication. I'm going to go find another doctor. But when you're on hydrocodone and you go to see another doctor to establish that doctor as your primary care physician, you're going to be prescribed the same medication.

So Hope Rogers started out on the same medication that she was already on.

The government put up, just a few seconds ago, the second critical, critical piece of evidence that they didn't tell you about. We had to ask the question.

Dr. Aultman, if you're saying you can't give hydrocodone, you shouldn't give hydrocodone and Xanax in combination with each other when you're pregnant, why is her OB prescribing her hydrocodone at the hospital while she's pregnant?

Because she's on hydrocodone. When she's in

pain, that's what doctors prescribed her. Her own OB prescribed her the same drugs that the government wants to try to convince you was illegal. But you know that Dr. Walker -- it's in the notes. You just saw it again on the board, and we put it on in the cross-examination. Dr. Walker, at the ER in Jackson, prescribed her hydrocodone, the same drug. Well, he didn't prescribe her Xanax. Well, he knew she was on Xanax because it's on the PMP.

More importantly, Dr. Aultman. I know we're talking about a black box warning. Again, completely left out. They -- the government told you about the black box warning, but they didn't tell you that, in times, it might be necessary to prescribe those drugs for pregnant women, and if you do, the standard of care would be to do what? High-risk OB.

What did Hope Rogers tell you she had? A high-risk OB because her medical doctors, not her nurse practitioner -- her medical doctors knew what she was on and knew to take the steps necessary in order to make sure, as she told you, she had a healthy, beautiful baby girl.

And you got to see the photos of her at birth.

Child wasn't injured. She received the medical care

that, in Jeff Young's opinion, medical opinion, was

reasonable and necessary and that had two other -- at least two other physicians who were aware of it, one of them who was also prescribing the exact same drug.

There's absolutely no basis in this evidence for Counts 2 through 7. There's just no way, unless you sit here and say Dr. Walker was prescribing her drugs illegally.

The final counts with the two undercover officers, again, complaining of pain, saying they had tried other medications. Dr. Aultman said, well, you know, yeah, it's unfortunate, but patients really do come in and say, well, I tried, you know, somebody else's medication, and it worked. And I -- you know, I probably should tell them that that's illegal, and you can get -- but -- but that happens. That's fairly common. We know that's common. We've all done that.

Wife has a prescription bottle, doesn't use it all, Flexeril or some muscle relaxant. And you're like, oh, I hurt my back working out in the yard; I'll take one of these. We all do it. And we go to the doctor, and what do we do? Well, you know, I tried my wife's Flexeril, and it really helped. We get the prescription. That's all it takes.

These two young ladies -- and I submit to you the proof is -- or at least the circumstantial evidence is they picked women with the hopes that they were going

2.5

to somehow get it on tape Jeff trying to flirt or hit up these women. He didn't. The most he did was, hey, I'm having a Halloween party; you should check it out. And that was the extent of it. No exchange of phone numbers, no address, no date.

But they came in with their own individual complaints, which is what patients do. They come in; they have symptoms; they have complaints. You've seen, and you can look at them in the back there. Have a full file, records that had been written up, blood pressures.

So they've done -- they come in; they check in; they're seen by somebody in the clinic to do the workup, which is, well, let's go get on the scale; let's take your blood pressure. What are your problems? Let me write down -- anything I need to tell the doctor today, why you're here?

And then what happens? Jeff Young walks in the room. Hey, I understand you have lower back pain, da, da, da. You're -- in fact, the St. Lawrence (phonetic), the second CI, actually had a PMP. And when you see Jeff going through the files, the PMP had been in the file, so he would have known that she was currently being prescribed the medication, that another physician had prescribed her that medication, and, again, continuing that line of care.

Now, again, you don't have to like his prescribing. You don't even have to like him. I mean, that's -- this is not - this is not a "like or dislike Jeff Young" kind of moment. This is whether or not what he was doing was illegally outside the course and scope of his usual practice, dispensing and becoming a drug dealer, going beyond his license and taking on that role as the drug dealer.

No. He's seeing patients, again, rushed, not putting the time into it because it's absolutely impossible to spend the appropriate amount of time with the patients with that caseload. Listening to the symptoms, asking them what helped, what didn't help.

Well, let's try something else. I'll see you back in a month; we'll see how that works. Too strong? Too weak? About right? Okay. Good. Let's just keep it there.

That's being a -- that's being a healthcare professional. That's in his practice. He's not intentional.

Count 1. There's no agreement.

Hope Rogers: Absolutely fine. Had two doctors on it doing the exact same thing. Everything was being handled professionally.

Undercovers: At worst -- at worst, maybe just carelessness, if you think it was wrong. That's if you think it's wrong.

Carelessness: Maybe if somebody had gotten injured, it might be a negligence claim, a malpractice claim, but it's not a drug dealer claim. It's not. It's not a crime.

Again, healthcare providers: We're talking about how we treat our healthcare providers. It's not that they prescribed drugs. They're supposed to prescribe drugs. That's what their job is it to do. They have a license from the DEA to prescribe drugs. It has to be so far beyond the scope of that license that they've completely disregarded their entire practice of medicine. It cannot be for a medical reason. It's got to be outside of the scope.

It's not your job to shut his practice down.

It's not your job to claim that he's negligent or that he committed malpractice. Your job is to determine whether or not the government has proven that he's become a drug dealer. You don't have to like him. You don't have to agree with him. Look, you don't even have to feel sorry for him, if you think he was out there and purposely became this buffoon of a character with his horrible rapping and hanging out with women.

Speaking of the women, I'll leave you with this:

The government talks a lot about his use of the

prescription pad and sex. I agree with that. I would,

too, if I were a prosecutor. I'd do everything I could to tie those two together, right? Well, he was prescribing drugs for sex. Oh, I'd go for that. That's all we would talk about. We wouldn't talk about anything else. No Hope Rogers, no undercover agents. Here's the problem.

They didn't charge him with a single count of writing prescription to a woman he had sex with, not one. It's not charged. They didn't put on a single woman who said, oh, yeah, I was only having sex with Jeff Young because he was writing me prescriptions. Not one. Not a single witness.

You'll see in the indictment, when you take it back there -- and it's -- the indictment's long, and I'm going to be real honest with you, there's a lot of paper in this case, but do look at the indictment. The indictment does allege that he was using his prescription pad for sex, but it's in the conspiracy count. And he's not charged in the conspiracy count with using his prescription pad for sex. It's saying that part of the criminal agreement between him and someone else, part of that was for this purpose.

If you find that he was or if you believe that he was using his prescription pad for sex, there's no count in the indictment because Count 1, you must first

determine if there was an agreement between Jeff Young and somebody else for him use the prescription pad to have sex. So it's not there. It's in the conspiracy, and there is no conspiracy.

I didn't write the indictment, but it's you that have to follow the indictment. There are no substantive counts in this indictment based on that allegation. It's within and contained within the conspiracy count, and the conspiracy count, I believe you'll find, is not supported by the proof.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's been a remarkably quicker trial than I expected. I really appreciate that y'all have sat through this. The days have been long. You have more work to do.

On behalf of Jeff Young, we thank you and appreciate your time. I'm asking that when you go and deliberate, you look at the indictment; you look at the counts, and you return the verdict that this proof requires.

And, again, this proof was based on the government's witness telling you that they put on the evidence -- they didn't put on evidence that wasn't relevant to what they were trying to prove. I believe that through our cross-examination we have been able to show you that there is other proof to this case that will

and provide you facts and circumstances to acquit 2 Mr. Young of all counts in this case. 3 Their forty-, fifty-thousand-dollar expert 4 witness proved to you that Hope Rogers was treated 5 appropriately and had the proper care with a high-risk 6 No conspiracy. Nothing in this case that rises 7 above carelessness. 8 The jury instructions the Court gives you, when 9 it talks about -- when it talks about what your duty is 10 to the proof -- gives you a good faith instruction in 11 your jury instructions. And at the bottom, please note 12 negligence and carelessness, foolishness are not 13 sufficient to convict. 14 Return the verdict of not guilty. Return the 15 verdict of not guilty. 16 Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 17 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ferguson. 18 We'll finish. 19 MR. FERGUSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 MS. PAYERLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 Okay. Good afternoon. I'm going to be very 22 My job here is just to address some of the things 23 that Mr. Ferguson just told you. 24 The framework for doing that is probably best 25 explained in the jury instructions about reasonable

doubt, just to give you some framework. It's very useful instruction, and it says while the government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It's only required that the government's proof exclude any reasonable doubt.

Possible doubts or doubts based purely on speculation are not reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a real doubt, a doubt that is based on reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence.

You-all are here. We have this jury system because you bring something to this courtroom that is so much more important than any of the law degrees or special training or medical licenses or anything that are sitting here, and that is your common sense. That's what you bring, and that is why it's so important that you exercise it when we're thinking about the defenses.

So I'm going to just quickly run through them and sort of view them just through the lens of common sense. So the first is just that there's been no conspiracy; there's been no agreement.

As we all talked about, through the lens of common sense, criminals don't get together in dark rooms and conspire with tinfoil hats to commit crimes and put

that in writing and sign a contract and so forth. What they do is they help each other through actions.

So Kristie Gutgsell, the office manager, testified that she pled guilty to agreeing to help Jeff Young in his criminal purpose. She said: I helped Jeff prescribe controlled substances by keeping the clinic open, loaning money to pay employees, keeping the door open. He couldn't have done that if I didn't help him

Dr. Alperovich: Although, he didn't sort of cop to the exact words of conspiracy, again, people rarely do, but they said -- he said: I pretended to be his supervisor.

And she pled quilty to aiding and abetting.

He said he lied to the nursing board when they investigated. He said he signed charts he knew to be problematic. And he, too, admitted that Mr. Young couldn't have done it without him.

And Dr. Rudin: You heard about him. He's the last preceptor through the last half of 2016. Jeff Young's buddy who lived in Chicago, who never set foot in the clinic, let Jeff Young use his name as supervising physician. And for that reasons — reason — in a text with Kristie Gutgsell at Exhibit 17, Jeff Young calls him, quote, the perfect preceptor.

Jeff Young needed these people. He needed these

people. These are just three. You may find others that you have heard from or heard about. But the evidence was that Jeff Young needed people to help him, to agree with him, to under -- they all saw. They all understood what he was doing here. And they agreed with him, and they helped him, and that's sufficient for a conspiracy.

The second thing you heard Mr. Ferguson say is that he was broken and overwhelmed. Let's take a look at whether that matches up through a lens of reasonableness with the evidence.

The fact is, folks, you got to meet Jeff Young during this period of time in his life because you saw him on video, and you saw him -- and you heard his voice in the recordings with Shirley Pickering. So you can actually see him and hear him for yourself during this time. You heard him on the video with Katie Crowder and Christina Norton. He was cool; he was calm; and he was collected. He was excited about his TV show. He was laughing.

You heard him in his interview with Board

Investigator Shirley Pickering lying with ice in his

veins, perfectly coherent about what the rules were and

lying smoothly that he was following them.

You heard from Daniel Rogers. Mr. Young said:
Pain's the plan. We're going to get people in here month

after month. That's where the money is. 2 And you heard that when Dr. Alperovich called 3 him in March of 2016 to say, hey, what's all this 4 internet nonsense? 5 What did Jeff Young say? Did he say, gosh, I'm 6 just so overwhelmed by my marriage that I can't help 7 myself, my divorce? 8 He said -- he said: This is my marketing 9 strategy. This is how I'm getting people into the 10 It's working. clinic. 11 Jeff Young knew what he was doing. He 12 understand -- he understood that controlled substances 13 were the way to get what he wanted. 14 And Mr. Ferguson told you that, you know, he was 15 just a bad practitioner. 16 This is really where your common sense is going 17 to come into play, folks. There's lots of drugs that 18 doctors can prescribe: birth control, diabetes 19 medication, blood pressure, heart meds. It's not like he 20 was just writing those prescriptions because he didn't 21 have time to spend with his patients. It's not like it 22 takes any longer to write a prescription for birth 23 control or heart meds. It's no accident he was 24 prescribing controlled substances, addictive drugs. 25 Cyndal Story was selling those drugs. Whitney

Henley was doing drugs at his house. You can see that in the text messages. Keith Moffit needed to get past detox. You think Amy Sanders would've been sleeping with him if he was prescribing her all the heart medication she wanted?

And that brings me to the role of sex for drugs in the indictment. Mr. Ferguson said that if -- there's no count about sex for drugs. Okay. Common sense again, folks. He also said there's no evidence that Mr. Young understood what he was doing was wrong, and that is the evidence. The evidence -- everybody understands it's wrong to trade sex for drugs, and he understood that, too. Right?

So that's part of the evidence, that he understood.

Look, I'm not prescribing these right. I'm abusing my prescription pad. I'm putting these drugs into the community: That's what you can use to re-anchor yourself when you're thinking about, what did Mr. Young think while he was doing all of this?

And then last, I want to talk quickly about continuity of care. Katie Crowder wasn't getting continuous care. She'd never had an opioid before in her life. Remember the undercover? She had a perfectly clean PMP. Dr. Aultman said she was opioid naive, and he

prescribed her hydrocodone and fentanyl in her first, like, three visits.

With Hope Rogers -- again, I want you to view this through the lens of common sense. Mr. Ferguson, I believe, said that because her OB/GYN, while she was in the hospital for preterm labor, prescribed her three days' worth of hydrocodone to take in the hospital -- Mr. Ferguson said this was, I believe, two docs doing the exact same thing. That's not the exact same thing as what Jeff Young was doing. You guys saw that for yourselves.

Through the lens of common sense, prescribing somebody some pain medications while they're in the hospital under the -- you know, where they can be examined, where they can be monitored, where they can evaluate that person's level of pain and the appropriateness of it is not the same as prescribing them 30, 90, 120 pills of hydros -- hydrocodones month after month, next to a Xanax prescription, with no actual diagnosis to explain why you're doing it. It simply isn't the same thing.

And so we ask that you bring your common sense to bear on these questions. The evidence is exactly what it looks like. Jeff Young absolutely understood what he was doing was wrong. He did it over and over again. He

did it for years, and that's why we stand by our request that you bring back a verdict of guilty on all counts.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

I think you've heard all of the proof, and you've heard all the arguments now. Now it's my fun task to read the instructions to you. First, I need to ask if anyone needs a break before we do this.

THE JURY: I do.

2.5

THE COURT: Okay. I figured I'd get at least one. And we're getting close to the noon hour. Probably in the next 10 minutes or so, your lunch is going to be ready for you. So it's going to take me about 30, 40 minutes to read this. I think we're going to go ahead, and I'll read this to you after lunch, after the lunch break.

We're a few minutes before noon, so we will pick this up at -- we'll just make it right at 1:00, 1:00.

That way -- and then I'll be ready to give this to you, and then the jury can begin your deliberations.

Not quite ready yet as far as the notes are concerned; still leave them in your chairs. Don't discuss. We're almost done. And I'm going to go ahead and excuse you into the jury room for break and then also for lunch.

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               (Jury out at 11:51 a.m.)
               THE COURT: Okay. We'll be down for a little
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 3
     over an hour. See everyone at 1:00, and we will conclude
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     at that time, let the jury start deliberating.
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               (The morning session concluded at 11:51 a.m.)
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4	I, LASHAWN MARSHALL, RPR, LCR, do hereby certify that the foregoing 84 pages are, to the best of
5	my knowledge, skill, and abilities, a true and accurate transcript from my stenotype notes of the Jury Trial
6	proceedings on the 31st day of March, 2023, in the matter of:
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10	Haited Chates of Turning
11	United States of America
12	VS.
13	Jeffrey W. Young, Jr
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15	Dated this 2nd day of April, 2023
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23	S/Lashawn Warshall
24	Lashawn Marshall, RPR, LCR Official Court Reporter
25	United States District Court Western District of Tennessee